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The Socialist government led by António Guterres (1995-1999) has thus inherited 
highly reformed but poorly regulated media and telecommunications sectors, and - so 
far - no structural communications policies were either announced or introduced. 
Basically, the Guterres government is following EU policies, attempting to strengthen 
existing regulatory bodies, and trying to improve a number of legal instruments. In this 
paper, we will start by presenting an historical perspective of the Portuguese media and 
telecommunications. Then, we shall look at the internal and external factors which 
partly explain the structural changes introduced in both sectors during the Cavaco 
Silva’s governments. After putting forward some of the most relevant aspects of the 
PSD communications reforms, we will turn our attention to the political intervention of 
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The most comprehensive changes in the Portuguese communications, since the 
1974-75 revolutionary period, were undertaken by the Social Democrats (Partido Social 
Democrata - PSD) during the absolute majority rule from 1987 up to 1995. Given the 
nature of political, economic and technological developments, changes in media and 
telecommunications were bound to be introduced. At the regional level, the European 
Union was developing policies in this area; conservative governments in the UK, 
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Germany and France persuasively argued for the liberalisation of markets and 
privatisation of state property. Important technological advances - mainly the 
development of satellite and optic fibre and the subsequent convergence of distribution 
technologies - had major implications. 
At a national level, significant changes were also taking place: the economy 
was growing and the liberalisation of the media and telecommunications markets were 
perceived as inevitable. Furthermore, the pro-business approach of the PSD 
governments - led by Cavaco Silva - favoured the privatisation of state media and 
telecommunications companies. Indeed, under the Social Democrats majority 
governments, newspapers which had been nationalised during the revolutionary period, 
returned to private hands. The radio sector was liberalised and one public radio station 
was privatised. The television public service operator lost the monopoly as two national 
television companies were allowed to operate television commercial channels. 
Similarly, and in line with EU policies, the telecommunications market was opened up 
to new actors and the three public telecommunications operators were merged and later 
privatised. 
The Socialist government led by António Guterres (1995-1999) has thus 
inherited highly reformed but poorly regulated media and telecommunications sectors, 
and - so far - no structural communications policies were either announced or 
introduced. Basically, the Guterres government is following EU policies, attempting to 
strengthen existing regulatory bodies, and trying to improve a number of legal 
instruments. 
In this paper, we will start by presenting an historical perspective of the 
Portuguese media and telecommunications. Then, we shall look at the internal and 
external factors which partly explain the structural changes introduced in both sectors 
during the Cavaco Silva’s governments. After putting forward some of the most 
relevant aspects of the PSD communications reforms, we will turn our attention to the 
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Media Recent History 
After the 1974 revolution, the media endured major convulsions. Pre-
censorship was immediately abolished whilst a ferocious confrontation for the control 
of the most important media had just started. Very different factions co-existed within 
the so-called 'winners' of the revolution. Hence, no consensus would be easily achieved 
as to what role the media should play in a post-dictatorial society and a chaotic situation 
could hardly have been avoided. 
Mesquita et al.i identify three conflicting tendencies in the aftermath of the 
revolution: 
- The inheritors of the old regime who tried to postpone the dismantling of 
censorship mechanisms. In terms of further legislation, this faction was in 
favour of a posteriori  repressive measuresii ; 
- The defenders of revolutionary Marxist ideas who were also favourable to a 
posteriori  censorship; 
- The adherents of a pluralist concept of the media, based on a Western model 
of democracy. This faction argued for the abolition of any form of censorship 
mechanisms, arguing that the courts would be the appropriate stage for media 
disputes. 
Notwithstanding these conflicting views, two major pieces of legislation 
approved after 1974 were strongly against the control of the media by any form. The 
1975 Press Lawiii guaranteed that the 'press freedom will be exercised without 
subordination to any form of censorship' (Art.4º). Similarly, the 1976 Constitution 
suggested that the pluralist view of the media was clearly successful. It stated that the 
freedom of the press was guaranteed and that no group was allowed to exercise 
censorship or obstruct journalistic creativity (Art. 39º). These documents could be 
understood as pluralist, in the sense that they expressed the view that different interests 
in society should have the right to express themselves and to influence the political 
process. But, if this view succeeded in legal terms, a very different non-expressed policy 
was being implemented. 
Arguably because of the dangerous 'reactionary forces', leftist elements within 
the Movimento das Forças Armadas (MFA) contended that the media would have to be 
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controlled during the revolutionary period. There was a clear contradiction in the MFA 
programme which contemplated both the 'abolishment of censorship and previous 
examination' and the creation of an 'ad hoc committee to control the press, radio, 
television, theatre and cinema' in order to 'safeguard military secrets and to prevent 
disturbances which could be provoked in public opinion by ideological aggressions 
from the most reactionary sections of society'iv. 
This ad hoc committee transformed itself enormously, according to which 
faction was more powerful within the MFA movement and within the Junta de 
Salvação Nacional.  First, radical leftist media were censored but, with the removal of 
the more conservative General Spínola, after the 28th of September crisis, the leftist 
wing gained progressive strength and the ad hoc Committee concentrated its activity 
among the rightist/conservative press. From the 6th of September 1974 to the 28th of 
February 1975, 28 publications were suspended whose majority was close to the 
Catholic Churchv. 
The battle for media control right after the revolution and, particularly, after 
the 28th of September, was far from being fought only within the ad hoc Committee 
which had powers to suspend and punish newspapers which were out of the leftist 
'revolutionary' line. Elements close to the MFA movement were appointed to leading 
posts both in radio and television. By early 1975, the panorama in the electronic media 
was perceived as being chaotic. In Salgado Zenha's words, 'what is now going on in the 
Emissora Nacional and on television is very grave because there is no single censorship 
but several'vi. This highly volatile situation got even worse with the installation of the 
communist provisional governments of Vasco Gonçalves, after the 11th of March coup. 
The publication of the pluralist Press Law, the month before, did not prevent the 
increasing levels of media instrumentation. 
In addition to the creation of a Press Council (Conselho de Imprensa) to 
safeguard press freedom, the Press Law contemplated extensive guarantees for 
journalists such as freedom to inform, freedom of thought, freedom of access to official 
sources of information, freedom of publication, among others. This legislation was 
however in clear contradiction with the Vasco Gonçalves' view of a communist society. 
So, in parallel with this law, the Social Communication minister, Vitor Alves, has 
created a new organism, the Conselho de Informação. The creation of this council was 
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justified by the need of 'an ample and internal debate and inter-change of ideas between 
the ministry of Social Communication and the State's media'vii. In reality, the goals of 
Conselho de Informação  were directly related with the Communist Party's intention to 
decide directly the state's media agenda and discourse. The Rádiotelevisão Portuguesa 
(RTP) and Emissora Nacional (EN), in particular, were to be used in the construction of 
a 'People's democracy'. 
Indeed, in this revolutionary period, the press which was still in private hands 
was 'transferred' to public ownership. Three days after the leftist coup of 15th March 
1975, important sectors of the economy such as banking and insurance were 
nationalised. Because many leading newspapers were owned by strong economic 
groups and banks, they became state property. 'From the important dailies, only the 
República  in Lisbon and O Primeiro de Janeiro, in Oporto remained in private 
hands'viii. The nationalisation of the press was never explained as a political option. 'It 
was presented as an indirect consequence of the nationalisation of the banking sector'ix. 
But behind this option was clearly the will to control what was left out of government's 
direct influence. Significantly, the nationalisation process was not reversed with the 
removal of the communist prime minister, Vasco Gonçalves, in November 1975. 
Under Gonçalvismo, the electronic media were directly controlled by leftist 
forces, but the 'moderate' VI provisional government would only increase the state's 
media ownership. Radio was nationalised, with the exception of the Catholic Rádio 
Renascença (RR) which had been in communist's hands during Vasco Gonçalves's 
governments. The newly created national radio company was called Empresa Pública 
de Rádiodifusão (EPR), although it would later be re-named Rádiodifusão Portuguesa  
(RDP). RDP and RR came to be known as the radio duopoly which remained untouched 
until the explosion of illegal radio stations in the mid-1980's. The television company 
RTP (Rádiotelevisão Portuguesa, SARL) which had been managed directly by the 
government since the coup (law-decree nº 278/74) was also nationalised by late 1975 
(law-decree nº 674-D/75 of 02.12.75), being established as the public company RTP-
Rádiotelevisão Portuguesa, EP. The RTP monopoly only ended with the opening up of 
TV channels to private initiative in the early 1990's. 
Both RDP and RTP have been under the control of successive governments. 
'Clear evidence of this is given by the fact that since 1974 the eleven seats on the board 
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of governors and the 20 directors posts at RTP and RDP have been held by 80 and 130 
different people respectively, whose qualifications for the job were considered less 
important than their party membership cards'x. Indeed, administrations have changed 
even more frequently than governments. The height of that instability was reached 
during the three and a half years of the Aliança Democrática (AD) which made the most 
blatant move to put radio and television at the service of the government. In the words 
of the first chairman of the board appointed by the AD and 15º President of RTP (from 
February 1980 to July 1980), Victor Cunha Rego, 'impartiality in state television was 
unthinkable'xi.  
What is particularly remarkable about the media development in Portugal is 
that laws drawn up during an exceptional period shaped the media until the 1980's. This 
aspect suggests that the authoritarian nature of the provisional leftist governments suited 
the newly created democrats. Despite the 1976 Constitution (with its impressive display 
of civil liberties), no elected government was prepared to grant freedom to the press. 
Generally, following the political measures introduced during the revolutionary period, 
politicians from all affiliations have not openly designed media policies but have merely 
taken the necessary steps to ensure that the nationalised media would be favourable to 
those in power. 
 
Telecommunications Recent History 
 
Although telecommunications are fundamental to the state’s security and to the 
economic development, the Salazar regime paid little attention to civilian 
communications and maintained the basic market structure from the 1920’s up until the 
1960’s. Marcello Caetano, on the contrary,  perceived telecommunications as a means 
to help revive the economy and, in fact, from 1968 up until 1974, important investments 
were made in both internal and international telecommunications. But, despite 
investments, Portuguese telecommunications were still backward, when compared with 
most Western countries. 
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From the 1974 revolution until the early 1980’s, no government introduced 
any significant change in the telecommunications sector. In 1981, a telecommunications 
reform was attempted and a significant Law Decree (188/81) was passed in accordance 
with the government programmexii. This piece of legislation recognised that until then 
the government had been unable to co-ordinate public communications operators due to 
a lack of infrastructures and contemplated the setting up of the Instituto Português das 
Comunicações (ICP) to support the Ministério das Obras Públicas Transportes e 
Comunicações (MOPTC)  in the co-ordination of the telecommunications sector. Public 
postal and telecommunications services were to be maintained as a state monopoly, but 
the terminal equipment market was to be opened up to competition. Users of the public 
network were to be allowed to buy any terminal equipment approved by ICP.  
With the legal creation of ICP, some aspects of separation between regulatory 
and operational functions were contemplated for the first time. Although the effective 
setting up of ICP was postponed, according to the approved legislation, it should have 
had a role as a political initiator and as technical assistant to the government. Among 
other things, the Institute - under the tutelage of the MOPTC - would have had to 
prepare legislation, supervise public operators, approve equipment and manage the radio 
spectrum. Yet, despite this legislative effort, there was no implementation of the law 
and the ICP was not actually established until 1989, after the approval of the Law 
Decree 283/89 which stated that ICP should start its activities within six months (Art. nº 
27). Apart from the political instability the country was in, the main reason why ICP did 
not start operating in the early or mid-1980's was related to the fact that the 9th 
Constitutional government (1983-1985) - led by the socialists - did not regard ICP 
favourably. In these circumstances, the liberalisation of terminal equipment, though 
contemplated in the law, did not materialise. 
Still, at that time, it was widely accepted that Portuguese telecommunications 
were lagging behind and that digitalisationxiii and optic fibrexiv would have to be 
introduced if the country was to catch up with the EU core countries. If agreement could 
be achieved about the need to modernise and update the sector, no consensus was 
possible on the strategy to be followed. Some argued for a progressive introduction of 
new technologies so that the Portuguese industryxv could adapt, but the political power 
favoured rapid change. According to Triboletxvi, 'only big multi-nationals could supply 
public digital exchanges given that there was no internal industrial or technological 
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basis to do it'. The 1983-1985 government decided to open up the switch contract 
bidding to seven different companiesxvii to 'demonstrate openness to the European 
Economic Community’xviii.  
 The allocation of these large procurement orders for central electronic 
switches was a multi-year story of intrigue at many levels. At the time of the award of 
the contract, Centrel (a national manufacturing company) had just entered a joint 
venture with Siemens for the production of switches developed by the German firm. 
Alcatel's interests were personally pushed by President Mitterand (a personal friend of 
the then prime minister, Mário Soares). German politicians also got involved in similar 
lobbying for Siemens. A highly politicised inter-ministerial commission decided to 
allocate 55% of the order to Siemens and 35% to Alcatel, despite the latter's lack of 
Portuguese production facilities. The remaining 10% were allocated in a complex 
manner among the winner companies. The allegations of impropriety forced the first 
social democrat government (1985-87) to re-open the case. The Siemens/Centrel 
contract was maintained but Alcatel lost its share  and Standard Electric received 45% 
of the contract. When all seemed lost for Alcatel, its parent company, CGE, acquired 
controlling interests in most of ITT's international telecommunications operations, 
allowing Alcatel to crack the Portuguese market after allxix. 
In addition to the procurement contracts for digital exchanges, 1985 was also 
relevant for national telecommunications because the first optic fibre cable was installed 
allowing the future introduction of new services such as videoconferencing and cable 
TVxx. The first Siemens' EWSD digital exchange was installed in June 1987 by TLPxxi. 
Although the mid-1980's were a turning point in terms of network modernisation, it was 
done - as Triboletxxii points out - without  safeguarding Portuguese industrial capability. 
Yet, rapid technological change, even at the expense of the national telecommunications 
industry, was perceived as being of crucial importance on the eve of Portugal's entry 
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Pressures for Change 
 
Given the nature of political, economic and technological developments in the mid-
1980's, changes in the media and communications were bound to be introduced. At a 
regional level, the European Union was developing its policies for television and 
telecommunications as radio and the press were not high on the EU agenda. 
Conservative governments in the UK, Germany and France (not to mention the US) 
persuasively argued for liberalisation of markets and privatisation of state property. Last 
but certainly not least, important technological advances - mainly the development of 
satellite and optic fibre and the subsequent convergence of distribution technologies - 
had enormous implications. The proliferation of European satellite TV channels, for 
instance, started being used as an argument against the national RTP monopoly. RTP's 
critics argued that, once one could receive international private TV channels, there was 
no reason why one should not have national private channels. 
 At a national level, important changes were also taking place. Up to the mid-
1980's, the political instability in the country was so acute that any comprehensive set of 
political decisions was hard, if not impossible, to implement. In 1987, one year after 
Portugal joined the EEC, the first majority government was elected since the 1974 
revolution. At that time, the country's economy was booming that being the main reason 
for a substantial rise in advertising revenue which had increased, in total, from around 
£52 million in 1986 to around £400 million in 1994xxiii. In this economic context, 
relatively unconstrained newspapers such as O Independente  and Público were set up 
and their existence seriously impaired the government's ability to suppress politically 
damaging material. In addition, the climate of opinion was turning against the 
concentration of the media in the state's hands. The Cavaco Silva's government itself 
believed that if Portugal was to be seen as a truly European partner, changes in the 
economy, and consequently in the media market, had to be introduced. A pro-business 
approach was taken and the liberalisation of the media market and privatisation of a 
substantial share of state media was imminent. 
 In Portuguese recent history, this would be the second time that a government 
opened up the media and picked winners. In the 1970's, Marcello Caetano tried to 
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maintain power over the press by allowing economic groups close to the regime to own 
periodicals. As the country was supposedly opening up and censorship was bound to be 
abolished, Marcello Caetano urged economic groups to buy out newspapers. In a 
different context, in the late 1980's and early 1990's, Cavaco Silva carefully chose the 
actors which would be allowed to participate in the newly liberalised broadcasting 
market and privatised state press. In other words, if liberalisation and privatisation could 
not be avoided, the media should be in the safest possible hands. 
External factors have also contributed to substantial changes in the 
telecommunications sector. By 1986, the EU telecommunications policy had already 
been designed around two contradictory trends: the support of the most competitive 
Information Technology (IT) companies through R&D programmes and, following the 
US example, the endorsement of more competition and liberalisation of equipment and 
services. Therefore, since Portugal joined the EU, the pressure to modernise and re-
organise the telecommunications sector has intensified and, on May 1986, Sequeira 
Braga, head of Secretaria de Estado dos Transportes e Comunicações (SETC), 
requested a study to examine Portuguese telecommunications and to report on the most 
pressing issues in this area. In May 1987, the Comissão para o Estudo do 
Desenvolvimento Institucional e Tecnológico das Comunicações (CEDITC) presented 
the studyxxiv to the respective ministry, MOPTC. 
This study argued that Portuguese telecommunications were lagging behind 
those of most European countries (by an estimated 15 years) and recommended the 
following changes: 
- The Institute of Communications (ICP) should be inaugurated and regulatory 
functions should be transferred to this institute; 
- A holding company should be set up to increase the efficiency of operators 
(CTT, TLP and Marconi). This company should guarantee a global and 
integrated strategy for the national telecommunications sector; 
- Postal and telecommunications services should be separated. Until then, CTT 
covered both activities; 
- Measures should be taken to prepare the opening up of telecommunications 
operators to private capital; 
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- More flexibility should be introduced into new telecommunications services. 
Possibly, competition should be introduced; 
- Prices should be liberalised in the non-basic telecommunications sub-sector. 
 
These recommendations - which were broadly in line with what was being 
discussed at European level at the time - were largely adopted by the 11th 
Constitutional Governmentxxv and constituted an important input to the 1989 Basic 
Telecommunications Law. This basic law was a real watershed in the Portuguese 
telecommunications legal history because the general principles of this sector were, for 
the first time, compiled in the same piece of legislation. Since the 1987 CEDITC 
recommendations were published, there was a dramatic increase in political activity 
surrounding telecommunications.  
 
Opening up the Media Market 
 
The two PSD majority governmentsxxvi undertook the most comprehensive 
changes in the media since 1974-75. Although the governmental programmesxxvii were 
vague and did not clearly set out the government's objectives for the sector, the 
following lines of action could be identified in these two programmes: 
- the nationalised press should return to the private sector 
- a minimum radio and television public service should continue to be provided 
by the state 
- the radio sector should be liberalised and/or privatised (e.g. Rádio Comercial) 
- a television act should be approved so two TV channels could be granted to 
private operators 
- the national news agency, Lusa, should continue to be publicly owned 
- attention should be given to the Portuguese communities abroad, to the 
Portuguese speaking peoples, and to the regional press and professional 
training. 
 Even if not expressed, some of these lines of action are still directly related to 
the control of content. The state's ownership and subsequent government's control of the 
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national news agency (Lusa) for example, is crucial  for the executive's dominion over 
political content both in the national and local media. This is mainly due to a lack of 
human and material resources in the media which forces them to rely heavily on Lusa. 
However, some policy proposals in this programme deal with structure of the media 
which is a shift from previous minority governments. 
The first set of measures directly related to the structure of the media 
concerned the re-organisation of the radio broadcasting sector. By mid-1980's there 
were so may illegal radio stations operating that the government could no longer ignore 
that reality. Nevertheless, it was only in 1989 that 310 local frequencies were allocated. 
In the following year, two regional frequencies were attributed: one went to Rádio 
Press, part of the Lusomundo group and the other to Correio da Manhã Rádio  which 
belonged to the Carlos Barbosa group. As early as 1976 there were calls for the 
legalisation of local and regional radio stations but no government was keen on doing 
so. 
In 1991, the two most important state owned and controlled newspapers were 
privatised. The government had been following a wide privatisation programme and 
there were no grounds to justify the maintenance of Jornal de Notícias  and Diário de 
Notícias  under state control. The government was in a dilemma between the perceived 
need to control those newspapers and the ideological and political belief in privatisation. 
In a controversial process, both were bought by Lusomundo, one of the most important 
multi-media groups in Portugal, perceived - at the time - as having close links with the 
government.  
In any case, the opening up of TV channels to private ownership was by far the 
most relevant aspect of Cavaco Silva’s governments’ media policy. Indeed, there has 
been considerable debate about private television, in particular, since the 1982 
Constitutional changes. The 1976 Constitution states that no TV channel could be 
privately owned and the 1982 review did not contemplate any changes in this area. 
Nevertheless, it unleashed some controversy about the issue. The Catholic Church was 
one of the first actors to openly express its desire to own and run a private TV channel 
but the political and economic conditions were not favourable. 
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From 1987 onwards, due to the economic growth and political stability, the 
Balsemão, Sonae and Presslivre groups started to seriously evaluate their possibilities in 
the new context. This process, however, was delayed until the early 1990's because the 
government had to concentrate its efforts on the re-organisation of the radio sector 
whose expansion had been chaotic since the mid-1980's. When local and regional radio 
frequencies were attributed, political interest moved again to private television. 
The constitutional obstacles towards private television were removed on the 1st 
of June 1989 when the National Assembly approved amendments in the legislative text 
by a two thirds majority. The new text allowed TV channels to be privately owned. The 
next highly controversial step was the drafting of a new television act. Conflicting 
interests were at stake and, once again, the Catholic Church was in the centre of the 
polemic. The Church wanted to be granted a TV channel without participating in the 
bidding process. So, when the government's law proposal was known, the Portuguese 
bishops went publicly against the government saying that 'the law proposal does not 
correspond to former commitments and to what was expected, it does not safeguard the 
Church's rights consigned in the Constitution'xxviii. In the 1970's, the Church had been 
granted an assurance by the former prime minister, Sá Carneiro, that it would be 
attributed a television channel. Hence, the religious leaders felt they were now being 
unfairly treated. The Catholic Church's Rádio Renascença  network was used to put 
these arguments forward and clerics throughout the country were given the task of 
reading and commenting on the bishops' position. 
In the middle of these serious rows and hot debates, Parliament approved a new 
television law on the 13th of July 1990 which did not contemplate any privileged 
position for the Catholic Church, but it also did not prevent the Church, in any way, 
from applying for a channel. The law says that 'the activity of television cannot be 
exercised and financed by political parties or associations, unions, professional and 
employers organisations, and by local authorities' (law nº 58/90, Art.3º). Still, 
significantly, religious organisations were not mentioned in this law. So, the Catholic 
Church was allowed to enter the competition. 
Once the new television law was passed and the bidding regulations approved, 
on the 2nd of April 1991, three candidates applied for the two available national TV 
channels: the Sociedade Independente de Comunicação (SIC) led by Pinto Balsemão; 
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TV1 Rede Independente, chaired by Proença de Carvalho with the support of the Carlos 
Barbosa media group (Presslivre), and Televisão Independente  (TVI), close to the 
Catholic Church. The other potential candidate, Sonae group, announced in January 
1991 that it would give up the competition. Sonae is a successful economic groups and 
the predictable lack of advertising revenues certainly contributed to its pulling out. 
Applying for a TV channel would be an expensive exercise and Sonae's chances of 
winning, whatever the quality of the project, would be very slim indeed. Sonae was - at 
the time - perceived as being close to the Socialist Party and the group's newspaper, 
Público, was often critical of government's policies. Hence, in spite of its economic 
strength, Sonae's political weight was limited. 
The three candidates put forward quite different projects which the 
government, with the approval of the Alta Autoridade para a Comunicação Social  
(AACS), had to choose from. 
The Proença de Carvalho candidacy (TV1) promised to broadcast from 8am to 
mid-night on a daily basis (on week-ends it could go until 2am). The channel would be 
generalist and popular. Programming would comprise news programmes (four news 
bulletins were predicted: three short ones and an extended one at night), telenovelas, 
talk-shows, movies, series and sports. According to the chairperson, the cornerstone of 
this project would be the emphasis on national production and the exclusivity of 
national capital. However, it was reported that there were contacts between Proença de 
Carvalho and Silvio Berlusconi, who would be prepared to make some investments in 
the Portuguese private televisionxxix This project was not selected, although Proença de 
Carvalho is a well known public figure, close to the social democrats, and with 
experience in the television arena. During Balsemão's government, Proença de Carvalho 
was the head of RTP. His political weight is considerable and, if the Church had not 
been in competition, Carvalho's project would have been selected. Even if other strong 
candidates had run, this candidacy would have had a real chance. 
Pinto Balsemão was the public face of the Sociedade Independente de 
Comunicação candidacy. SIC said that it was prepared to broadcast from 5.30pm to 
after mid-night. During week-ends, it would start at 3.30pm. Although SIC's general 
buzz-words were 'difference, popularity and intelligence', the main emphasis of this 
project was on information. Four news bulletins were predicted. SIC programming, 
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which could be changed each time the news justified, would include series, talk-shows, 
competitions and movies. At this early stage, SIC had 17 shareholders, from which the 
most important were Soincom, SGPS (25%); Globo Participações (15%); Banco Mello 
(10%); Espírito Santo Sociedade de Investimentos (6,25%) and Banco Totta & Açores 
(6,25%). Pinto Balsemão himself has 2,5% of the shares. According to Portuguese law, 
no national citizen or economic group is allowed to own more than 25% of the 
company, and no foreign company can invest in more than one TV channel nor is the 
foreign participation of any channel allowed to exceed 15% (law nº 58/90, Art.9º). This 
piece of legislation has been accepted with regard to non EU members. But TVI, for 
instance, has recently increased its foreign (EU) capital to approximately 40%, arguing 
that 'non-discrimination' EU legislation is in contradiction with national laws. In any 
case, this argument cannot be used for non EU members and the Brazilian Globo 
network could only invest the maximum allowed by the Portuguese law. 
Given that the negotiations between the Church and the government for a direct 
attribution of a TV channel failed, the Church went ahead with its candidacy. The main 
idea behind this project was to set up a channel of 'Christian inspiration' of true 'quality' 
and 'public utility'. Broadcasting was supposed to start on week days at 5pm and finish 
transmission around mid-night, whilst on week-ends it would go from 10am to 1am. In 
terms of programming, three news bulletins a day were predicted and, like the other 
projects, it would include series, movies, sports, quizzes and talk-shows. Although this 
would not be a 'religious' channel, TVI considered in its candidacy space for religious 
content. TVI had also plans to co-operate with television stations from the Portuguese 
Speaking African Countries (PSACs). The most important shareholders of this project 
were Rádio Renascença, the União das Misericórdias, Editorial Verbo  and Companhia 
de Jesus (institutions directly or indirectly related to the Catholic Church). The 
international shareholders were The Luxembourg Television Company (CLT) and the 
Spanish private television, Antena 3. 
So, it was in this context that the Government and the High Authority for the 
Media (Alta Autoridade para a Comunicação Social) had to decide. Politicised and 
without resources and credibility, the AACS  was not prepared to put forward its views 
on such a sensitive issue. But, as its opinion was required by the Constitution, the High 
Authority decided for 'technical equality' and no candidacy was excluded. The TV1 
project (Proença de Carvalho) was considered 'deliberately ambitious', TVI's (Church) 
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understood as 'modest' and SIC's (Balsemão) as 'balanced'. In this context, it was 
exclusively up to the government to decide on the issue. At that stage, the process was 
totally in control of the prime minister. Although in the beginning other senior 
politicians were involved, when final decisions were to be taken, Cavaco Silva managed 
the process himself. 
On the 6th of February 1992, after a Cabinet meeting, ministro Marques 
Mendes, publicly announced the results: SIC had been attributed the third national 
channel and TVI got the fourth channel. According to Marques Mendes, these decisions 
were taken considering the AACS opinion and four additional criteria: technical quality, 
economic viability, type and characteristics of the programming and the candidates 
ability to satisfy diversity and public interestxxx. But, for the opposition and for TV1, 
this result was no more than a 'political decision', taken without transparency. When the 
decisions were known, the editorial of Público newspaper stated: 'The government took 
the less politically damaging decision attributing the two private channels to the Church 
and to Balsemão, the candidates with more 'specific weight'xxxi. 
At that time, attention was almost exclusively concentrated on who would gain 
control over the two new TV channels. This is hardly surprising given that - until then - 
the state/government which owned RTP had effective editorial control over the 
company's output. If the same were to happen  with the new TV stations, politicians 
holding office would have to be extremely careful as to who 'deserved' such a  powerful 
instrument. All other crucial issues associated with the opening up of the market, such 
as sources of financing, balanced programming, and national production were 
neglected. Indeed, the government decided to attribute two licences and to abolish the 
television licence-fee without examining the conditions of the broadcasting market to 
support four national television channels. The Television Law (58/90 of 7 September), 
passed by Parliament, was so badly drafted that was totally ineffective and allowed TV 
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Opening up the Telecommunications Market 
 
 In line with what was being discussed in the EC at the time and following the 
Comissão para o Estudo do Desenvolvimento Institucional e Tecnológico das 
Comunicações (CEDITC) recommendations, the XI Constitutional Government decided 
to introduce major reforms in telecommunications sector. 
 Amongst the CEDITC recommendations, the first to be implemented was the 
separation of the regulatory and operational functions (until then the CTT/TLP 
exercised simultaneously both functions). The ICP gained effective legal existence 
through the law decree 283/89 of 23 August 1989xxxii. This piece of legislation 
supposedly created an environment which would allow an even-handed introduction of 
competition in telecommunications services. The EU and indeed other pro-competition 
international actors had been arguing that the dual regulatory and commercial function 
of the telecommunications operator could not be sustained in a new competitive 
environment because of the conflict of interests. Although these arguments were 
accepted and ICP was set up before the directive on competition in the markets for 
telecommunications services (90/388/EEC of 28 June 1990)xxxiii, no real autonomy was 
granted by the Portuguese government to the regulatory institute. 
According to the article 4 of law decree 283/89, ICP has a vast array of 
responsibilities to perform, namely to actively contribute to the sector's legal 
framework; to provide assistance to the government for the purposes of carrying out its 
tutelage responsibilities; to co-ordinate, on a national level, all matters concerning the 
carrying out of treaties, conventions and international agreements; to approve materials 
and equipment, to undertake the management of the radio electric spectrum; to license 
public sector communications operators in addition to providers of value added 
services; among others. The difficulty however is that, with the exception of technical 
matters, the ICP has merely an advisory/supportive role. No line has been clearly drawn 
between what is a policy and a regulatory issue. Furthermore, the members of the board 
of directors are appointed by a resolution of the Council of Ministers (article 6, law 
decree 283/89). So, even with its legally recognised administrative and financial 
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autonomyxxxiv and despite feasible strains, the ICP cannot be said to be a truly 
independent body.  
Immediately after the legal setting up of ICP, the Basic Law on the 
establishment, management and exploitation of telecommunications infrastructures and 
services (88/89 of 11 September 1989) was approved by the National Assembly. This 
Telecommunications Act can be understood as a real watershed in the Portuguese 
telecommunications legal history because, for the first time, the general principles for 
the sector were compiled in the same piece of legislation. According to this law, it is the 
responsibility of the state to guarantee the existence and availability of fundamental 
services, including fixed telephone services, telex and a switched data transmission 
service (article 8). However, the exploitation of services involving the use of 
complementary telecommunications infrastructuresxxxv may be carried out by public and 
private companies, once properly licensed (article 10). 
Similarly, the provision of value added servicesxxxvi may be made by any 
singular person or collective body (under specific conditions) and by the public 
telecommunications carriers and complementary telecommunications companies (article 
13). To sum up, apart from the fundamental services, which would continue to be 
provided by the state, other actors - either private or public - could from then on apply 
to become services providers. Only the telecommunications infrastructure was to remain 
firmly under the responsibility of the public telecommunications carrier (article 7). 
Although new entrants would have to comply with specific rules and 
regulations, the Telecommunications Act sets out some requirements concerning 
protection of competition. It states that public telecommunications carriers should 
guarantee the use of their networks for all communications carriers under equal 
competitive conditions. When public carriers provide complementary services they are 
equally forbidden to use any practice which may distort conditions of competitiveness 
or which are considered to be an abuse of a leading position (article 14). These legal 
provisions have not prevented alleged abuses of dominant position and accusations of 
unfair competition have been frequently reported. The implementation of these general 
principles - particularly those related to complementary and value-added services - 
required further legislation which 'should be made in accordance with the development 
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of market requirements and obligations created by Community legislation' (Law 88/89, 
article 21)xxxvii.  
These legal instruments - notwithstanding their significance - were not 
particularly controversial as the changes were perceived both as necessary and 
inevitable by both the government and the opposition main party, the Socialist Party. In 
general terms, it can be argued that the creation of ICP and the liberalisation of 
complementary and value-added services were directly and indirectly related to the EU 
legal framework. If Portugal had not passed this legislation, it would have had to 
comply later on with the ONP Council directive (90/387/EEC), with the Commission's 
Services directive (90/388/EEC) and subsequent legislation. Directives are indirectly 
binding in the sense that it is up to the member states to decide how the intended results 
of the legislation are to be achieved. In the Portuguese case, the liberalisation was 
nevertheless quite limited as, before the partial privatisation of Portugal Telecom, only 
3% of the telecommunications market was in the private sectorxxxviii. 
Even if these changes were ultimately introduced by the national parliament 
and government, it is quite clear that the EU played a role here. For the reasons we have 
previously analysed (ideological, political and economic), the EU persuasively 
convinced the member states that no alternative existed but to open up their markets. 
Core countries had very concrete interests in doing so whilst peripheral countries were 
convinced that they had not much to lose. So, the Council ended up approving 
legislation that would make it more difficult for member-states to take protectionist 
measures. For Portugal, the liberalisation process was perceived as inevitable once no 
other alternatives existedxxxix. 
In addition to the opening up of the telecommunications market to new 
entrants, the Portuguese authorities believed that the three traditional public operators 
(CTT, TLP and Marconixl) had to go through a re-organisation process. These operators 
were - for historical reasons - organised on a geographical basisxli which was considered 
by the government as inappropriate. So, a financial holding society, Comunicações 
Nacionais (CN) was set up in 1992 (Law decree 88/92 of 14 April 1992) mainly to co-
ordinate the sector, to define investment/business strategies and to deal with the 
privatisation process. CN started its operations in early 1993 comprising five 
independent public companies: the former postal services of Correios e 
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Telecomunicações de Portugal (CTT), now an independent company (also called CTT), 
Telecom Portugal (TP), the telecommunications arm of the earlier CTTxlii, Teledifusora 
de Portugal (TDP)xliii, Telefones de Lisboa e Porto (TLP) and Marconi. 
The creation of CN was defended by its chairperson, Cabral da Fonsecaxliv, as 
being the 'rational' choice for the sector. The two other alternatives were to maintain the 
historical scenario or to merge the companies, but the holding company was - according 
to him - the only solution with small disadvantagesxlv. This view, however, would not be 
maintained for long as Telecom Portugal would soon put in place its strategy to become 
the dominant actor in the Portuguese telecommunications scene. The president of 
Telecom Portugal from 1990 to 1992, Gonçalo Areia, had already publicly argued for 
the setting up of a single telecommunications operatorxlvi. But it would be the next 
president, Luís Todo Bom, (also vice-president of the party in power) who would 
convince CN and the government that the company he chaired was the only one that 
could adequately lead the re-organisation process. The plan was to take over TDP, TLP 
and Marconi. 
Despite Marconi's opposition and fierce criticisms from the government's own 
ranks, the merger went ahead. On the 20th of November 1993, in a long interview to 
Expresso, Cabral da Fonseca, argued that more than one company providing basic 
services in a country with ten million inhabitants and with the Portuguese GDP was 
unthinkable: 'there is no way of surviving in a competitive environment'. The CN's 
president previously believed that Portugal should have two basic service operators, one 
international (possibly the historic Marconi) and one national (possibly a new company 
resulting from the merger between TP and TLP)xlvii. No case was put forward to defend 
his new point of view but it became quite clear whose lobbying was more efficient. 
Interestingly enough, Luís Todo Bom has also never put forward a clear set of 
arguments to justify publicly why - in a country which has traditionally had three 
operators - a single PTT would provide a better service. He has argued, in very general 
terms, that Portugal should follow the Dutch model which is based on a single PTT and, 
furthermore, that the creation of a single telecommunications operation was essential to 
fight foreign competition when the market is fully liberalised between 1998 and 
2003xlviii. 
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Neither the government nor the operator which has benefited the most from the re-
organisation (PT) have been able to justify the paradox of arguing simultaneously for 
liberalisation and for concentration. On the one hand, it has been argued that 
liberalisation and full competition can only benefit the consumer; on the other hand, it 
has been argued that only a big operator can respond to the challenges imposed by 
liberalisation. In any case, because the re-organisation process was designed behind 
closed doors with no public debate and adequate consideration for long standing actors 
in the field, there was no need to prepare a consistent case. The process was conducted 
with speed but it certainly lacked participation. 
Just as with the re-organisation of the sector, the partial privatisation of 
Portugal Telecom is not a direct result of EU policies. According to O Siochrú, the only 
acknowledged problem the EU has expressed about LFRs concerned where they would 
find the resources to 'keep pace' with liberalisation - 'and indeed this may be no more 
than a veiled reference to privatisation'xlix. But, even if the EU has tried to convince its 
members to privatise, it has no open policy on the issue and member states can decide 
their own strategies. Portugal has decided to enter the North American/European 
bandwagon. 
The ministro  Ferreira do Amaral  has publicly stated that - whether we want it 
or not - the telecommunications sector will be exclusively private because public 
companies have no agility nor vocation to stand a chance in a competitive market. 'This 
is happening in all countries in the world. I do not know any [country] which is, at this 
stage, thinking about nationalising the telecommunications sector and the vast majority 
is thinking about privatising'l (speech delivered at the APDC conference in Lisbon, 
November 1994). From this speech, two features emerge: i) if most countries are 
privatising, Portugal must do it as well, ii) even if Portugal resists privatisation, it would 
happen anyway. Yet, Ferreira do Amaral has not attempted to explain the benefits of 
privatisation and he has not attempted to explain why public companies (whose 
managers have been appointed by the social democrats over the last decade) have 
performed poorly. The telecommunications sector in the country was in private hands 
since the 19th century up until the 1960's, and in the public sector ever since. In both 
periods it has performed deficiently. 
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On the 20th of March 1995, just before the privatisation went ahead, the 
government granted PT a public service concession contract for 30 years (due for 
renewal in 15 years). According to this contractli, PT has the exclusive right to provide 
basic telecommunications services and to manage all telecommunications 
infrastructures which support these services because the infrastructures will remain in 
the public domainlii. The company will have the monopoly of basic services until this 
area is liberalised in January 2000. 
After the first stage of PT's privatisation, on the 13th of July 1995, the Council 
of Ministers approved the abolition of Comunicações Nacionais. CN had been co-
ordinating the restructuring of the sector and preparing the privatisation of PT. Still, CN 
had not been able to actually lead the process and was too weak to fight lobbies and 
balance the needs and interests of the various actors involved in national 
telecommunications. Ferreira do Amaral, quoted in Públicoliii, argued that CN would 
come to an end because it has accomplished its mission (14 July 1995:32). Furthermore, 
Cabral da Fonseca stated that he would calmly assist the evolution of the sector because 
'the essential had already been done and it is irreversible'liv.  
 
Guterres Government: Tuning up Reforms 
 
As we have mentioned earlier, major reforms in the media/communications 
system were indeed introduced by the two Cavaco Silva’s majority governments. The 
Socialists have hence inherited a transformed yet poorly regulated arena and weak 
regulatory bodies. António Guterres’ government programmelv did not contemplate any 
significant changes in the media/communications system instead proposing to 
strengthen existing regulatory bodies and to improve legal tools. 
The government’s programme referred to communications in three different 
dimensionslvi: mass media, telecommunications and information society. In terms of 
mass medialvii, the Guterres government considered the following priorities: right of 
information, revitalisation of the media sector, independence in the management of the 
media public sector, and the media as a toll of international politics. In order to 
accomplish these objectives, the government intended to take the following measures: 
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a) to pass a new Press Law which guarantees in an innovative manner freedom 
of information and journalists rights; 
b) to modify the composition of the High Authority for the Media (which was 
perceived as being highly politicised); 
c) to revise the role of the High Authority for the Media in order to widen its 
powers and influence; 
d) to provide financial incentives to local/regional radio stations; 
e) to revise the Public Service Television contract between RTP and the State; 
f) to establish a Public Service Radio contract between RDP and the State; 
g) to develop management models which might guarantee the independence of 
public broadcasters from the government; 
h) to develop an integrated audio-visual, television and telecommunications 
policy; 
i) to alter the statute and the capital structure of the news agency Lusa; 
j) to promote in the ratification of the European Convention on Transfrontier 
Television; 
k) to develop the co-ordination of RDP, RTP and Lusa international services; 
l) to guarantee an independent and pluralist information for Portuguese 
communities abroad, paying particular attention to the Portuguese language 
and culture, and to the Portuguese speaking African countries. 
In terms of telecommunicationslviii, the government programme stated that it 
would promote the necessary measures in order to guarantee real competition in 
telecommunications services, and that it would introduce liberalisation in 
communications services, according to EU directives and market changes.  In order to 
achieve the stated goals, a number of initiatives were predicted: 
a) promotion of the needed measures to ensure that competition is the rule in 
the communications services; 
b) progressive liberalisation of telecommunications services; 
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c) establishment of strategic alliances to guarantee the participation of Portugal 
in the international communications business; 
d) encouragement of the national communications equipment industry; 
e) support to the establishment of a national content industry. 
 Regarding the so-called information societylix, the government programme 
considered that IT was absolutely crucial to the development of a 21st century society. 
As such, the new technological potential would be put to use in order to transform 
social and economic life: 
a) reinforcing the scientific and technological infrastructure; 
b) increasing the usage of information technologies by citizens and companies; 
c) using IT to modernise Public Administration; 
d) training people for the development of an Information Society 
Though it is still early to analyse the 1995-1999 socialist mandate, one might 
look back and attempt to examine some aspects of the implementation of these electoral 
guidelines. In the broadcasting arena, a new television Act was passed (Law 31-A/98 of 
14th of July). The new television Act introduced changes in both the access to and 
exercise of the television activity. For the first time, the possibility of creating local, 
regional and thematic channels was consecrated by law. Up until Law 31-A/98 was 
approved, the Portuguese television broadcasting system already included a number of 
channels: two public national channels (RTP1 and RTP2), two private national channels 
(SIC and TVI), two public regional channels (RTP-Açores and RTP-Madeira), and two 
public international channels (RTP África and RTP Internacional). Cable television and 
satellite television reception were also well established realities but companies were not 
allowed to produce their own programmes. Only third party transmissions were legally 
possiblelx.  
The new television law has opened up the thematic channels’ flood gate. 
Terrestrial television companies are therefore associating themselves with cable 
operators and international content producers in order to guarantee their places in the 
new broadcasting scenario. SIC, for example, has associated itself with the Brazilian 
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network TV Globo  and the biggest national cable operator,TV Cabo, in order to develop 
the Premium TV project.Premium  TV is offering two codified movie channels 
(Telecine1 and Telecine2) since June 1998. RTP has, in February 1998, signed a 
contract with TV Cabo, and with a company with multiple interests in sports, 
Olivedesportos. This consortium is operating, since September 1998, a codified Sports 
channel, Sport TVlxi. According to the Secretário de Estado da Comunicação Social, 
Arons de Carvalho, local/regional television channels are not expected to be licensed 
before 2005 or 2006lxii. 
The proliferation of television channels does not necessarily mean that the 
financial situation of broadcasting companies has improved during the Guterres’ 
mandate. In fact, TV stations such as RTP and TVI have had important financial losses 
over recent years. The advertising market is small and, apart from SIC, terrestrial 
broadcasting companies have had highly unstable management mainly due to the lack 
of advertising revenues and debt accumulation. When the broadcasting market was 
opened up to private initiative, in 1992, the Cavaco Silva government abolished the 
television license-fee and sold RTP’s transmission network to Portugal Telecom. These 
political decisions, which were not reversed by the current government, put RTP in a 
difficult economic situation and transformed a so-called Public Service Broadcasting 
into a standard commercial television, i.e., RTP had to fight for audiences trying to 
conquer a meaningful slice of the adverting cake.  With this strategy, RTP was neither 
performing its duties as a public service nor being successful as a commercial company. 
Socialist António Guterres’ government tried to modify RTP’s ambiguous 
strategy, preparing a new Public Service Contract between the State and the public 
operator. ‘Public service’ as a set of tasks, as contemplated in the previous contract, was 
abolished with the signing up of a new Public Service contract in December 1996. 
Unlike the previous one, the new contract sees Public Service as a mission, as a 
programming philosophy. The contract defined more clearly RTP’s objectives but it has 
not solved its financial problems. 
Apart from the new television law, the government has also expressed some 
concern with digital television. Although terrestrial digital television is not expected to 
be introduced before 2001, the prime minister has announced, on August 1998, that  it 
would be introduced 'as soon as possible'. As a result, the Instituto da Comunicação 
Social  (Media Institute, known as ICS) and the Portuguese Communications Institute 
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(ICP) co-ordinated a public consultation process on Digital Video Broadcasting - 
Terrestrial (DVB-T) from August up until October 1998. 
Not unlike its Social Democrat predecessors the Socialist government also 
considered international broadcasts of great importance to its foreign policy. Under the 
PSD’s tutelage, RTP’s International channel (RTP Internacional) and RDP’s 
international channel (RDP Internacional) were launched. Recognising the relevance of 
these instrument, António Guterres supported their expansion and consolidation. Most 
Portuguese communities abroad and Portuguese speaking nations can effectively watch 
and listen to these international television and radio channels. In addition, the current 
government decided, along with RTP and RDP, to set up channels (RTP África and 
RDP África) specifically designed for Portuguese speaking African countries (Angola, 
Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and S. Tomé and Príncipe). RTP África and 
RDP África are indeed establishing themselves as news and programming sources in 
Lusophone Africa. Lusa news agency is also reinforcing its links with Portuguese 
speaking African countries. 
In the radio broadcasting sphere, the socialist government has also developed 
and/or revised a number of legal tools. Basically, it made it compulsory for local radios 
to produce their own content (most were simply broadcasting national radio stations 
feed) and created financial incentives, namely subsidising technological modernisation, 
providing institutional advertising, and reducing telecommunications costs (due to an 
agreement with Portugal Telecom). 
As stated in the government programme, independence in the media public 
sector and journalists’ rights were also high on the agenda. Therefore, both the Press 
Law and the Journalists’ Statute were altered. These revised tools intended to expand 
pluralism and independence within media companies and to reinforce journalist’s 
rights.  Changes in the Media regulatory body, High Authority for the Media, were 
introduced as well. Indeed, this entity was perceived as highly politicised and its 
influence was very limited. The 1995-1999 socialist government altered its composition 
and widen its powers. It should be noted that most of these changes are yet to be proved 
effective. In fact, the shadow of State control still hangs over both RTP and RDP and 
periodical allegations of interference have been made by journalists during this four 
year period. 
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In the telecommunications arena, it might be argued that Law-decree 381-A/97 
of the 30th of December was particularly relevant. This law-decree established the new 
telecommunications access regime for the activity of a public telecommunications 
networks operator and provider of public telecommunications services, and aimed at 
simplifying the access to the telecommunications market. From then on, a number of 
telecommunications services no longer required authorisation from the 
telecommunications regulator (Instituto de Comunicações de Portugal). Apart from 
fixed telephony, public networks and services implying the attribution of frequencies, 
all other telecommunications services have to be registered at ICP, but not authorised by 
the regulator. The ‘freedom of establishment’ principle aims at reducing bureaucracy 
and allow for an easier entrance of new actors into the market. The Law-decree 381-
A/97 is in itself a transposition of EU regulation to the national legislative body, namely 
directives 96/2/EC (mobile and personal communications), 96/19/EC (introduction of 
full competition in the telecommunications market), and 97/13/EC (common framework 
for authorisations and licenses in terms of access to the telecommunications market)lxiii. 
 
In September 1998, a new mobile phone operator entered the market. Optimus, 
a Sonae group project,  forced the other two operators (Telecomunicações Móveis, TMN 
and Telecel) to reduce tariffs. Due to an aggressive pricing policy, right before starting 
operating, Optimus  already had half a million so-called ‘pre-adherents’, i.e., people 
who have put in writting their intention to become an Optimus client. Despite 
substantial investments (expected to be between 350 million Euros and 500 million 
Euros in the first three years), the Sonae holding is predicting Optimus to break-even by 
2001. 
In the Information Society arena, some measures were effectively taken. In 
1997, the Portuguese government published the Information Society Green Paper, an 
attempt to develop and implement policies within the ‘Information Society’ framework. 
In the aftermath of this green paper, a number of political measures were introduced and 
implemented in 1998. The National Science, Technology and Society Network, is being 
set up. This scientific network plans to bring together national researchers and to 
stimulate and consolidate R&D. In a move very similar to the one being developed in 
Britain, the Ministério da Ciência e da Tecnologia (Science Ministry) is also making an 
effort to introduce the Internet in every school of the country (from the 5th to the 12th 
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grade), universities, libraries, and research centres. ‘Computers for all’ is another 
project being developed. The ‘Computer for all’ project has the objective of increasing 
the number and usage of Internet connected computers at home. In addition, a 
considerable number of small-scale initiatives, such as the creation of telework centres, 
are under way. Around 20% of the population has access to the Internet, though only 
10,6% use the Internet regularly. The Internet is mostly used at school, then at work and 
thirdly at home. Internet is most relevant in the education sector (amongst academics 





This article started by presenting a general overview of the media and 
telecommunications’ recent history as we believe that any a-historical attempt to 
examine current communications in Portugal is bound to be faltering. Then, we tried to 
demonstrate that structural changes in the media and communications were introduced 
during the Cavaco Silva majority governments. Due to external and internal factors, 
changes were seen as inevitable. From telecommunications to the press, all 
media/communications sub-sectors were transformed.  
When António Guterres came to power in 1995, it had reduced room for 
manoeuvre. Major changes in the markets structure had already been introduced (and 
most were understood as irreversible), and the EU was intervening more frequently and 
more consistently in the communications arena. Therefore, in the telecommunications 
domain, the 1995-1999 government basically followed EU directives whilst in the 
media (as the EU is far less influential in this sector) it attempted to improve perceived 
deficiencies inherited from the previous government. 
Notwithstanding the refereed differences between Cavaco Silva and Guterres 
governments concerning actual intervention in communications, there are also some 
distinct aspects regarding the mode of governance. During the Cavaco Silva rule, 
political power was largely concentrated in the hands of the prime minister and a few 
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senior politicians. Despite the formal dispersion of power (a number of Secretarias de 
Estado and government bodies were involved in policy-making), all fundamental 
aspects of communications/media policy (e.g. the opening up of television to private 
initiative) were dealt with by the prime minister himself. Most decisions were taken 
behind close doors with no justification being provided.  
The Guterres government tried since early days to involve social actors in the 
decision-making process. ‘Dialogue’ has been a key word and it has some meaning in the 
communications arena. Indeed, and despite the continual formal fragmentation of power in 
this policy-area, the different Secretarias de Estado involved in the sector have been trying to 
implement a more open decision-making process, promoting public consultations and 
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